Maṇimēkhalai

Book XXIX
[Buddhist Logic]

After bestowing his blessing upon the young lady who had made her obeisance to him in due form, Saint Aṟavaṇa said to her:

‘Pilivaḷai the daughter of the king of Nāga Nāḍu, made over her tender baby, born to Neḍuvēl-Kiḷḷi, to Kambaḷa Śeṭṭhi whose single ship touched the island on its way to India. Taking the baby from her, with the respect due to its royal origin, Kambaḷa Śeṭṭhi set sail from there on his homeward journey. On that day, at the darkest part of the night and very close to the shore, the boat capsized. Not seeing the child after the accident the Śeṭṭhi duly reported the loss of the baby to the king, who, in his anxiety and occupation in directing the search of the baby, forgot the festival of Indra.

Indra, in his turn, commanded, through goddess Maṇimēkhalā, that the city of Puhār be swallowed up by the sea. An ancestor of your father generations ago suffered shipwreck and was lost in the sea, much like a golden needle in a rich carpet of gold, and was struggling for seven days continuously without [205] losing life altogether. Understanding this by the quiver in his white carpet, Indra commanded the goddess to rescue, from suffering death in the sea, that one who was to become a Buddha. She carried him out of the sea in order that the Pāramitā The Perfections, generally ten but the number is sometimes given as eight and even six. These ten are (1) Dāna (charity), (2) Śīla (Purity of conduct), (3) Kṣāntī (Patience), (4) Vīrya (Strenuousness), (5) Dhyāna (Meditation), (6) Prajñā (Intelligence), (7) Upāya (Employment of right means), (8) Praṇidhāna (Resoluteness), (9) Bala (Strength) and (10) Jñāna (Knowledge). might receive fulfilment, that the Dharma Cakra may keep revolving.

Hearing from the knowing Cāraṇas (Wanderers through the air). that that was her habitual function, your father gave you her name. Your renunciation was that very day intimated to him in a dream with all the clearness of reality. Since through her the city had been overwhelmed, your mothers and myself retired to Kāñcī for your sake.’

Having heard this Maṇimēkhalai said in reply, after making a profound obeisance,

‘Even so said Tīvatilakai, who worships the golden seat of the Buddha, to her.

In accordance therewith, I assumed another disguise in that fair city (Vañji), and heard the varied teaching of the sects, each system expounded according to its own authoritative works (Nūl, Sūtra). I took none of them really to heart as they were not acceptable, and carried them just as I did the disguise I put on. May the holy one therefore instruct me in the truth.’

Aṟavaṇa Aḍigaḷ assented and expounded the teaching of Buddhism as follows:–

‘The first teacher is Jinēndra; his instruments of knowledge (Aḷavai) are but two, namely, faultless perception (Prattiyam or Pratyakṣa) and inference (Karuttu or Anumāna). Knowledge acquired by direct perception [206] is taken to be Śuṭṭuṇarvu (Pratyakṣa, perception).

Name (Nāma), class (Jāti), quality (Guṇa), and action (Kriyā), are excluded from this as they are obtainable in inference (Anumāna) as well. Inference by cause or consequence, and common (Sāmānya) inference are liable to error. That which is free from error is inference from result as from smoke, fire.

All the other Pramāṇas In the absence of any specific recital of these in this context these must refer to the six said ‘to be prevalent at the present time,’ in Book 27 above. are capable of being included in Karuttu and may be treated as Anumāna.

Other means of knowledge are the following five, namely:– (1) Pakkam (Sans.: Pakṣa, proposition, also called Pralignā); (2) Hētu (reason); (3) Tiṭṭāntam (Sans. Dṣṭānta, example, also Udāharaṇa); (4) Upanaya (application); and (5) Nigamana (conclusion).

Of these Pakkam consists in saying that this hill has fire on it. When you state, it is so because it smokes, you are stating the reason. If you add just like a kitchen, you are giving an example. To say that the hill also smokes is to state the application (Upanaya). If it has smoke it must have fire is coming to a conclusion.

That which has no fire can have no smoke, like water, is the contrary concomitant of the proposition, and is negative application. Thus it serves as application by contrariety-negative concomitance. When the real reason (Hētu) is based on identity (Svabhāva), the proposition or subject takes the form, sound is non-eternal.

When we urge, because it is artificial, we state the attribute of the subject (Pakṣa dharma). ‘Whatever is made is non-eternal like a pot,’ is a similar case (Sapakṣa), with the example added. Whatever is not eternal and not capable of being made like ether is the [207] counter case (Vipakṣa with example) and gives the concomitance of contrariety.

In negative pramāṇa the statement that in this open space there is no pot constitutes the subject. ‘Because it is not seen’, is the attribute of the subject. ‘As they do not exist, we have not seen the horns of a rabbit’, is a similar example of that method. When we say ‘whatever exists will be seen like a myrabolam in the open hand’ is a similar but counter-statement. It is in this way that what is urged as reason establishes facts.

If you ask what it is that smoke (as reason) establishes, the existence of smoke proves the existence of fire by the positive concomitance, where there is smoke there is always fire, and the negative concomitance there is no smoke where there is no fire. If so, when one sees before him smoke, the darkness proceeding straight from it, or going up in spiral, as this is due to fire, when you see something dark and smoky overhead you must infer the existence of fire. If co-existence thus establishes facts, then when one who had formerly seen an ass and a woman at one place and at one time, sees an ass at another time, he should infer the existence of a woman then and there. No. This will not do.

If the negative concomitance will prove that there is no smoke where there is no fire, one who did not see in the mane of an ass the tail of a fox because he saw no tail of a dog, could rarely infer the existence of a dog’s tail in another place where he saw the tail of a fox. Therefore even that is inadmissible. Upanaya (application) and nigamana (conclusion), connected with the Dṣṭānta (example) as they are, may be regarded as included in it.

Pakṣa (proposition), hētu (reason), Dṣṭānta (example) are of two kinds, valid and invalid. Among [208] these, the valid proposition is that which has included in it (1) the explicit subject possessed of attributes, and (2) the changes that the plainly discernible attribute of the conclusion undergoes when found elsewhere.

For example, to say that sound is either eternal or non-eternal is a valid proposition. In this the subject possessed of attributes is Śabda. Sādhyadharma (attribute of the conclusion) is its being either eternal or non-eternal. The reason (hetu) is of three kinds; (1) being attributive to the subject; (2) becoming attributable to a similar subject and (3) becoming non-attributable to the opposite.

If sapakṣa (similarity of character) is to be established, the attribute must be, as stated in the proposition (pakṣa), ascribable generally (poduvahai or sāmānya). Sound is non-eternal like a pot. If its vipakṣa, contrary concomitance, is to be stated, whatever is not non-eternal is not made like ether (ākāśa). The fact of being and the act of appearing as a result of the making, being respectively attributable to the subject (pakṣa) and the example (sapakṣa) and not so attributable to the contrary or negative concomitant, becomes the valid reason for predication of non-eternality to sound.

Valid Dṣṭānta (example) is of two kinds:– Sādharmya (similar character) and Vaidharmya (different character). A Sādharmya example is, sound is non-eternal like a pot when they exist together. Vaidharmya example consists in the non-existence of the reason when the conclusion does not exist. These constitute valid means of proof.

Fallacious pakṣa (proposition), hētu (reason) and eduttukkāṭṭu (Dṣṭānta or example) are the following:– Fallacious propositions are of nine kinds: (1) Pratyakṣa viruddham, (2) Anumāna viruddham, (3) Suvacana viruddham, (4) Lōka viruddham, (5) Āgama viruddham, [209] (6) Aprasiddha viśeṣaṇam, (7) Aprasiddha viśēṣyam (8) Aprasiddha ubhayam, (9) Aprasiddha sambandham.

Of these (1) the first contradicts direct experience as in ‘sound cannot be heard by the ear’.

(2) Anumāna viruddham consists in making contrary inference as in describing a non-eternal pot as eternal.

(3) Suvacana viruddham consists in contradictory speech as in describing one’s own mother as a barren woman.

(4) Lōka viruddham contradicts general experience as in saying that the moon is not the moon.

(5) Āgama viruddham consists in making statements contradictory to accepted books of authority as when the non-eternalist Vaiśēṣika calls eternal that which is non-eternal.

(6) Aprasiddha viśeṣaṇam consists in not understanding that which is provable by the opponent, as when a Bauddha tells the eternalist Sāṁkhya that sound is destructible.

(7) Aprasiddha viśēshyam, consists in a statement where the proposition is not capable of predication to the opponent, as when a Sāṁkhya states to a Bauddha, who does not believe in the existence of a soul, that the soul is capable of understanding.

(8) Aprasiddha ubhayam consists in a statement which to the opponent is unacceptable either as a proposition or as the conclusion; as when a Vaiśēṣika tells a Bauddha (who believes neither in happiness nor in soul), that, for happiness and all else connected with it, the source of origin is the soul.

(9) Aprasiddha sambandham consists in proving that which is already accepted by the opponent, as when a Bauddha is told that sound is non-eternal – a statement which does not require to be proved to him.

Similarly Hētuppoli or fallacious middle term is of three kinds:

(1) Asiddham or unproved; [210]
(2) Anaikāntikam or uncertain, when the lack of truth of the middle term is recognized by the one party only, and
(3) Viruddham or contradictory, as when the truth of the middle term is open to question. Of these the first Asiddham is of four forms, namely:–

(1) Ubhayāsiddham, (2) Anyathāsiddham, (3) Siddhāsiddham
and (4) Āśrayāsiddham.

Of these four, the first is where the predicate or the middle term is not acceptable as true to both the parties, as when it is said, that sound is a eternal because it is seen.

(2) Anyathāsiddham is where the middle term is not recognized by the opposing party, as when it is said that:

Sound is a product of evolution
And therefore non-eternal.

It seems unproved to the Sāṁkhya who does not admit that sound is a product of evolution, but is merely a reflex of that which is in the mind; as in the example:

Sound is a product of evolution
Therefore it is not eternal.

The fact of evolution being no more than the expression of the speaker’s understanding, it will not be acceptable as a reason to the Sāṁkhya.

(3) Siddha-asiddham consists in the reason or the middle term being doubtful in drawing a conclusion, as [211] when that which appears before one may be taken to be either vapour or mist, it is actually taken to be smoke, and from that, the conclusion is drawn that there must be fire behind.

(4) Āṣraya-siddham is to prove to the opponent the non-existence of the Dharmin or the middle term as when one states that

Ether (or ākāśa) is a substance
Because it has the quality of sound,

the conclusion is unproved to him who believes that ether is not a substance.

Anaikāntikam similarly is of six forms:–

(1) Sādhāraṇa;
(2) Asādhāraṇa;
(3) Sapakkaikadēśaviruddhavipakkavyāpi;
(4) Vipakkaika dēśaviruddhacapakkavyāpi;
(5) Upayaikadēśaviruddha and
(6) Viruddhavyabhicāri.

Of these, Sādhāraṇa consists in the common hētu or middle term being uncertain, both in the Sapakṣa and in the Vipakṣa (a similar and the counter case), as in the example:–

Sound is non-eternal
Because it is cognizable.

The quality of cognizability is a common quality of things eternal and things non-eternal. It is cognizable to be non-eternal as in the case of a pot, a product; it is cognizable to be eternal as in the case of ether.

(2) Asādhāraṇa is that in which the hētu or the reason which is contemplated is non-existent either in the similar case or in the countercase, as in the example:

Sound is eternal
Because it is audible. [212]

The reason of audibility, if it exists in the minor term, does not exist in the Sapakṣa or Vipakṣa or the exceptional. In other words, it is not general enough, and therefore it becomes doubtful and uncertain.

(3) Sapakkaikadēśaviruddhavipakkavyāpi consists in the hētu or the reason or the middle term abiding in some of the things homogeneous with and in all of the things heterogeneous with the major term, as when it is said:

Sound is the product of effort
Because it is non-eternal.

Here the reason or the middle term while it exists in lightning and ether (ākāśa) both of which are not products of effort, it abides in lightning, but is not seen in ākāśa, and therefore it is non-eternal. Since it, resembles the pot it may get destroyed and therefore become a product of effort, or whether it will get destroyed as in the case of lightning and will not be the product of effort. Thus it becomes open to doubt.

(4) Vipakkaikadēśaviruddhasapakkavyāpi consists in the hētu or the middle term while it abides in apart of things heterogeneous, it abides in all things homogeneous with it, as when it is said:

Sound is the product of effort
Because it is non-eternal.

The reason or the middle term non-eternal exists in ākāśa and lightning which are heterogeneous with being the product, while it shows itself in lightning and does not in ākāśa. In the sapakṣa as in the case of the pot, it abides in all things. Therefore it becomes doubtful whether being non-eternal as in lightning, it will not show itself as a product, or being non-eternal as a pot it will still appear as a product of effort. [213]

(5) Upayaikadēśviruddha consists in the reason or the middle term abiding in some of the homogeneous and some of the heterogeneous things from the major term as when it is said:

Sound is eternal
Because it is non-corporeal.

In this example the middle term non-corporeality on the side of eternal is found in ākāśa and in the minute atoms which are homogeneous with things eternal, and make them incorporeal. Similarly in the case of things heterogeneous with those that are eternal as a pot or happiness. This incorporeality abides in happiness and does not abide in a pot. Therefore whether the middle term abides only in some of the things it cannot be treated as anaikāntikam as it leads to the doubt whether things incorporeal are eternal like ākāśa or non-eternal like happiness.

(6) Viruddhavyabhicāri consists in the middle term not being distinctly the reason, for the thesis supports even that which is contradictory to the thesis, as in the example:

Sound is eternal
Because it is the product of effort.

While this may be regarded as valid in so far as it applies to the pot, etc., which are homogeneous as being products of effort, sound is eternal because it is audible as is the character of sound, is also equally valid. Since the validity is equally good for both the thesis and its contradictory, it ceases to be Aikāntika (peculiar).

Viruddha is of four kinds, namely:–

(1) Dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhanam: where in the statement of the Pakṣa or Dharmin, the major term is contradictory to the Sādhana or the middle term; [214]

(2) Dharmaviśēṣaviparītasādhanam: where the Dharmaviśēṣa or the attribute or the predicate implied in the major term is contradictory to the middle term, Sādhana;

(3) Dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhanam: where the form of the minor term is contradictory to the Sādhana or the middle term; and

(4) Dharmaviśēṣaviparitasādhanam: when the predicate implied in the minor term is contradictory to the Sādhanam or the middle term.

Of these the first is found when in the hētu, the middle term, the major term is faulty, as in the example:

Sound is eternal
Because it is a product.

In this the character of being a product implies that sound is non-eternal. Therefore the hētu or reason of being a product establishes the non-eternality which is contradictory to the eternality stated in the middle term. Hence the contradiction between the two.

(2) The second consists in the reason or the hētu offered being contradictory to the attribute implied in the major term, Sādhyadharma; for example:–

The eyes and other instruments of sense are for the
service of something else.
Because they are composed of particles
Like bed, seat, etc.

Of these the hētu or the middle term ‘being composed of particles (like bed, seat, etc., which are of service to someone else)’ make the eye and other organs of sense also serviceable to someone else. This someone else like the occupant of a bed or seat is made one distinct from the eye and other organs of sense, and thus the soul; a thing without organs is made into a thing with organs. This is contradictory to the actual attributes of the major term, which is Ātman here, and not [215] body merely; thus it makes the soul which is without any sense organs possessed of organs, and constitutes a contradiction between the major term and the middle term.

(3) The third consists in the hētu or the middle term by itself contradicting the form of the minor term, as in the example:–

Bhava (existence) is substance, but not action, nor has it quality.
Whatever substance has both quality and is capable of action is different like the character of sāmānya (generality).

The hētu or the middle term which illustrates that substance, quality and character being combined in it, Uṇmai (Bhava or existence) is stated to be something distinct. This is sāmānya (podu) which gives the reason for the existence of the three. This Uṇmai (Bhava or existence) not being found in the Sādhya or the major term and the Dṣṭānta or example, but not containing the attributes of Sāmānya or the generality nor any other attribute what is stated to exist in the Dharmin or the minor term, is made to be non-existent, and thus becomes contradictory.

The fourth consists in the establishment of the non-existence of the attributes in the Dharmin or the minor term. In the example given above, the Bhava or existence is the doing and the quality of the doer. Since this is contradicted, it may also be taken as contradicting that which is predicated in the middle term.

Fallacious Example

These are what are called Dsṭāntābhāsa or examples containing fallacies. It was already stated that Dshṭānta is of two kinds, namely, Sādharmya and [216] Vaidharmya (or homogeneous and heterogeneous). Of these the former is of five kinds:–

(1) Sādhanadharmavikalam, or imperfect middle;
(2) Sādhyadharmavikalam, defective major term;
(3) Ubhayadharmavikalam, defective major and middle;
(4) Ananvayam, non-concomitance, and
(5) Viparīta-anvayam (contradictory concomitance)

Similarly heterogeneous example is also of five kinds, namely:–

(1) Sādhya-avyāvtti (not heterogeneous from the opposite of the major term);
(2) Sādhana-avyāvtti (not heterogeneous from the opposite of the middle term);
(3) Ubhaya-avyāvtti (heterogeneous from neither the opposite of the middle term nor the opposite of the major term);
(4) Avyatirēkha (a heterogeneous example showing the absence of disconnection between the middle term and the major term);
(5) Viparītavyatirēkha (a heterogeneous example showing the absence of an inverse disconnection between the middle term and the major term).

(1) Of these Sādhanadharmavikalam consists in the example exhibiting a defective middle term, as in the example,

Sound is eternal
Because whatever has no corporeal form is eternal
Therefore what is seen is paramāṇu (indivisible atom).

In this the example paramāṇu being eternal and at the same time corporeal contains to the full the character of the major term, but is defective in not being possessed [217] of the character of the Sādhanadharma, or the middle term.

(2) Sādhyadharmavikalam; in the example offered the character of the major term is defective, as in

Sound is eternal
Because it is non-corporeal
Whatever is non-corporeal is eternal, as Buddhi (intelligence).

In the example Buddhi (intelligence) which is brought in as an illustration being non-corporeal and therefore being non-eternal at the same time, shows to the full the non-corporeality, which is the character of the Sādhana or the middle term, being defective in eternality, which is the predicate of the major.

(3) Ubhayadharmavikalam; in the example given both the major and the middle are found defective. This is of two kinds, Sat and Asat. Example of Sat is, in a thing that exists that which is predicated shows both a defective major and a defective middle, as in the example.

Sound is eternal
Because it is non-corporeal
Whatever is non-corporeal is eternal like a pot.

Here the pot, which is brought in as an example being a product, does not partake of the character of the eternal as predicated in the major, nor of the character of non-corporeality predicated in the middle; thus it shows itself to be defective both in respect of the major and in respect of the middle. Asadubhayadharmavikalam shows a similar double defect in a thing non-existent, as in the example

Sound is non-eternal
Because it is corporeal
Whatever is corporeal is non-eternal like ākāśa (ether). [218]

In this the example Ākāśa does not partake of the character of non-eternality predicated in the major, nor the corporeality predicated in the middle, to him who states that Ākāsa is non-existent. On the other hand, to one who believes in Ākāsa being existent, it is eternal, and non-corporeal. Therefore to him also it is defective both in respect of the major and in respect of the middle.

(4) Ananvayam (non-concomitance in example) consists in the middle and the major, without stating the connection between the two, exhibiting the real character of both, as in the example,

Sound is not eternal
Because it is a product
A pot is a product and non-eternal.

In this example the general concomitance that ‘whatever is a product is not eternal’ not being stated, the concomitance between the major and the middle is not made clear.

(5) Viparita-anvayam (the contradictory concomitance). This consists in establishing concomitance merely by the concomitance of the example with that which is predicated in the major term, as in the example,

Sound is non-eternal
Because it is a product
Whatever is not eternal is a product.

In saying so, concomitance fails, because the universal statement whatever is a product is not eternal, is not stated, and therefore it fails in as much as the major is not drawn as a conclusion from the middle; on the contrary, the statement of universal concomitance is made from the major term. The defect consists in this; what is predicated in the major may be more extensive than that which is stated in the middle term, as in whatever is not eternal is a product. [219]

(1) Sādhya-avyāvtti consists in the example being incompatible with that which is predicated in the middle while it is not so with what is predicated in the major; as in the example,

Sound is eternal
Because it is non-corporeal
Whatever is non-eternal is also not non-corporeal as Paramāṇu.

In this example, the paramāṇu which is brought in as an example, being eternal and corporeal as well, it is incompatible with the non-corporeality predicated in the middle, while it is compatible with the eternality predicated in the major.

(2) Sādhana-avyāvtti consists in the example being incompatible with what is predicated in the major while it is not so with that which is predicated in the middle; as in the example,

Sound is eternal
Because it is non-corporeal
Whatever is not eternal is also not non-corporeal, like Karma.

Here the heterogeneous example Karma, while it is non-corporeal, is at the same time not eternal. Therefore it is incompatible with the eternality predicated in the major and is compatible with the non-corporeality predicated in the middle.

(3) In Ubhaya-avyāvtti the heterogeneous example brought in for illustration while being incompatible with what is predicated in the middle term and the major is of two kinds:–

(i) Ubhaya-avyāvtti in that which exists and
(ii) Ubhaya-avyāvtti that which does not.

The former is a heterogeneous example in things that exist which do [220] not show incompatibility with the predicate of the major and the middle, as in the example:–

Sound is eternal
Because it is non-corporeal
Whatever is non-eternal is also not non-corporeal like Ākāśa.

In this Ākāśa that is brought in as a heterogeneous example is eternal and non-corporeal to him that believes in its being a substance. Therefore the eternality predicated in the major and the non-corporeality predicated in the middle are both of them not incompatible. But to him that does not believe in its being a substance, in the example,

Sound is non-eternal
Because it is corporeal
Whatever is non-eternal is also not corporeal like Ākāśa.

In this, to him that says that Ākāśa is not a substance, as it is itself non-existent, the non-eternality in the major and the corporeality in the middle are both neither compatible nor incompatible.

(4) Avyatirēkha where that which is predicated in the major being non-existent, the non-existence of that which is predicated in the middle is not stated, as in the example,

Sound is eternal
Because it is a product
Whatever is non-eternal, it is also not a non-product.

Without making an explicit statement as the above when one asserts that in a pot, both the character of being a product and of the non-eternality exist, it is Viparītavytirēkha in heterogeneous example. Viparītavyatirēkha [221] consists in a statement of non-compatibility in illogical order, as in the example,

Sound is eternal
Because it is corporeal.

In this instead of stating that wherever eternality does not exist there corporeality also does not exist, but stating instead, that wherever there is not corporeality there eternality also does not exist. In this way of stating it, there is an incompatibility of Vyatirēkha.

By the fallacious reasoning, which has been thus expounded, understand clearly the character of fallacious inference, and by applying this method, make sure of whatever you know to be correct knowledge.’